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Abstract 
All forms of Brexit are bad for health, but some are worse than others. This paper builds on 
our analysis using the WHO health system building blocks framework to assess the likely 
effects of Brexit on the NHS in the UK. We consider four possible futures: (1) D³1R'HDO´
Brexit under which the UK leaves the EU on 29 March 2019 without any formal agreement 
on the terms of withdrawal; (2) the Withdrawal Agreement, as negotiated between the UK 
and EU and awaiting (possible) formal agreement, which provides a transition period until 
the end of December 2020; (3) LIWKH1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG3URWRFRO¶VµBackstop¶FRPHVLQWRHIIHFW
after the end of that period; and (4) the Political Declaration on the Future Relationship 
between the UK and the EU. Our analysis shows that a No Deal Brexit is significantly worse 
for the NHS than a future involving the Withdrawal Agreement, which provides certainty and 
continuity in legal relations while the Future Relationship is negotiated and put into legal 
form. The Northern Ireland µBackstop¶KDVYDULDEOHLPSDFWZLWKFRQWLQXLW\LQVRPHDUHDV
such as health products, but no continuity in others. The Political Declaration envisages a 
future relationship which is centred around a free trade agreement, in which wider health-
related issues are largely absent. All forms of Brexit, however, involve negative 
UHSHUFXVVLRQVIRUWKH8.¶VOHDGHUVKLSDQGJRYHUQDQFHRIKHDOWKERWKLQ(XURSHDQG
globally, and significant harmful consequences for the ability of parliament and other 
stakeholders to scrutinize and oversee governmental actions. 
 
  
2 
 
Introduction: the current position 
All forms of Brexit are bad for health, but some are worse than others. This was the 
conclusion of our previous analysis,1 considering possible scenarios for the EU-8.¶VIXWXUH
relationship. That analysis was, of necessity, limited as the objectives of the UK government 
were, at that time, unclear, reflected in the oft-UHSHDWHGVWDWHPHQWWKDW³%UH[LWPHDQV%UH[LW´
While Theresa May SURYLGHGVRPHFODULILFDWLRQRQKHUJRYHUQPHQW¶V 12 objectives in her 
Lancaster House speech in January 2017,2 this offered few details as to how they might be 
achieved. Moreover, some seemed difficult to reconcile, such as free trade with the EU and 
the ability to do separate trade deals with the rest of the world. As 6LU,YDQ5RJHUVWKH8.¶V
Permanent Representative to the EU who resigned just before the Lancaster House 
speech,3 QRWHGLQDUHFHQWVSHHFK0D\¶VDSSURDFKWRQHgotiations made it impossible to 
achieve her first and last objectives, to provide certainty and arrange an orderly exit from the 
EU. 
Yet, by December 2018, two documents were negotiated. The first, which would be legally 
binding, is the Withdrawal Agreement. This covers manyEXWQRWDOODVSHFWVRIWKH8.¶VH[LW
from the EU, including continued SD\PHQWVFLWL]HQV¶ULJKWVDQGWKHVWDWXVRIWKHERUGHULQ
Ireland. Some especially contentious areas, such as fisheries, have been left for later. The 
second text, which is not legally binding, is the Political Declaration on the Future 
Relationship. This sets out some broad intentions concerning a final relationship between 
the UK and EU.  In theory, the details will be fleshed out during the transition period set out 
in the Withdrawal Agreement lasting until December 2020, although given the lack of 
agreement within the UK and the speed of progress so far, many commentators believe that 
this will take a much longer time.  
Given these developments, we are now able to provide an updated evaluation. Leaving 
aside remaining in the EU, which is better overall for the NHS than any form of Brexit, we 
consider four possible future relationships between the UK and the EU:  
(1) ³No Deal´ Brexit;  
(2) the Withdrawal Agreement, during transition;  
LIWKH1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG3URWRFRO¶Vµ%DFNVWRS¶FRPHVLQWRHIIHFWDQG,  
(4) the Political Declaration on the Future Relationship.  
We are not comparing these scenarios with the effects of remaining in the EU as that was in 
our previous analysis. 
8QGHUDµ1R'HDO¶%UH[LWWKH8.OHDYHVWKH(8RQ0DUFKZLWKRXWDQ\IRUPDOOHJDO
arrangements in place. This will happen automatically, under the provisions of the EU 
(Withdrawal) Act 20184 and Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) unless the 
UK, with the agreement of the EU and its Member States, acts to stop it. This is uncharted 
WHUULWRU\EXWWKH(8KDVEHHQFOHDUWKDWWKHOHJDOVWDWXVRIWKH8.ZLOOEHWKDWRIDµWKLUG
FRXQWU\¶ZLWKDOOWKDWHQWDLOV5  
As noted above, the detailed legal text of the Withdrawal Agreement6 brings into effect a 
transitional period, to the end of December 2020, during which the UK is no longer an EU 
Member State, but many aspects of EU law continue to apply in the UK. The Withdrawal 
Agreement makes specific provision to protect the rights of EU-27 nationals in the UK, and 
vice versa, up until the end of transition, and beyond, for citizens from the UK and EU27 who 
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DUHLQHDFKRWKHU¶VWHUULWRU\in December 2020. For instance, they will be able to achieve 
residence rights/settled status in the UK; continue to benefit from social security 
entitlements, such as pensions already accrued; and have personal data protected.  
The Northern Ireland Protocol WKHµ%DFNVWRS¶, a binding part of the Withdrawal Agreement, 
will come into force if, at the end of transition, no future EU-UK agreement(s) is/are in place 
to resolve the challenges associated with the land border between the UK and EU on the 
island of Ireland. Because the Common Travel Area arrangements, permitting unimpeded 
movement between the UK, Ireland, and the Crown Dependencies (Channel Islands, Isle of 
Man) will continue for people, but not for goods and servicesWKH3URWRFRO¶VIRFXVLVRQ
products crossing that border. The Protocol establishes a single customs territory between 
WKH(8DQGWKH8.DORQJZLWKµOHYHOSOD\LQJILHOGUXOHV¶RQWKLQJVOLNHHQYLURQPHQWDO
protection and labour standards) for all trade in products between the UK and EU. Where 
products are imported into Northern Ireland from the EU, unjustified non-tariff barriers are 
forbidden, and EU legislation on marketing and safety standards for products applies in 
Northern Ireland. The Protocol itself does not require the same standards for products being 
produced or marketed in the rest of the UK, but if the UK wants to keep a single regulatory 
market including Northern Ireland, and avoid an internal border in the Irish Sea, then in 
practice the UK will need to align with EU standards.7 Given that trade agreements take 
years to negotiate (the EU-Canada agreement took five years to negotiate and the EU-
Japan and EU-Singapore agreements took almost as long), and run to hundreds of pages 
(the EU-Canada agreement is over one thousand pages),8 and the Political Declaration is 
only 26 pages long, we should take seriously the possibility that the Backstop in the protocol 
on Northern Ireland comes into effect. It may in fact become the future relationship between 
the UK and the EU, at least for the medium term.  
The Political Declaration on the Future Relationship is not formally contingent on the 
Withdrawal Agreement, although its negotiation will surely be affected politically by the terms 
under which the UK leaves the EU, as a No Deal Brexit will be harmful for the EU as well as 
for the UK. The Political Declaration currently points to a free trade agreement (FTA) similar 
to the EU-Canada agreement,9 with some enhanced aspects, none of which is directly 
relevant for health. As noted above, unlike the Withdrawal Agreement and its Protocol, it is a 
political statement only. The details are yet to be agreed, and it is in the nature of a political 
text that it could be changed relatively easily, but of course only if political agreement could 
be reDFKHGRQDGLIIHUHQWPRGHOVXFKDVµ1RUZD\¶RUµ1RUZD\IRUQRZ¶, both of which 
would involve a closer alignment than is the case with the EU and Canada, and which would 
include free movement of people).  
Whether the Withdrawal Agreement will be agreed remains uncertain. The Agreement did 
not attract a majority vote in Parliament on 15 January 2019, even after lengthy delays to win 
support.10 May is now seeking some changes to the Withdrawal Agreement. However, it is 
difficult to envisage how it could be changed substantively without altering either the UK ¶V
so-FDOOHG³UHGOLQHV´RIZKLFKWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDUHHQGLQJIUHHGRPRIPRYHPHQWIRU
SHRSOHDQGZLWKGUDZDOIURPWKHDXWKRULW\RIWKH(8¶V&RXUWRI-XVWLFHRUWKH(8¶V
negotiating position which includes the integrity of the single market.  
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Method 
As LQRXUSUHYLRXVDUWLFOHRXUPHWKRGLVWRXVHWKH:+2¶VKHDOWKV\VWHPEXLOGLQJEORFNV11 to 
assess the likely effects on each aspect of the NHS in the UK, under the four different 
futures we envisage. These are set out in Table 1. For each, we categorise effects as 
broadly unchanged (grey); positive (green); moderate negative (pale red); or major negative 
(red). We offer a timely analysis, based on the current likely futures for the UK, and so we 
are working from the available legal and political texts. At this time, of course, the meanings 
and significance of those texts have not been tested. This is an inherent limitation of the 
standard methods of legal and policy analysis that we adopt here. The unprecedented 
nature of a Member State leaving the EU after over 40 years of membership is an obvious 
limitation of our approach: there are no equivalent comparative situations. The scale of the 
challenge can be inferred from the fact that the Long Term Plan for the English NHS 
mentions Brexit only twice in 136 pages, neither offering any detail of what it might mean or 
how any threats might be addressed.12  
Analysis and Discussion 
1. Health and social care workforce 
Perhaps the most important challenge for the NHS post-Brexit concerns the health 
workforce. Existing shortages will be exacerbated if Brexit results in an exodus of health 
professionals from other EU/EEA countries, and promised future investments in UK-trained 
healthcare staff cannot resolve this in the short term.13 Overall average figures (some 10% of 
doctors in the NHS in England, for instance) hide specific areas of greater concern, with 
some regions especially reliant on EU/EEA staff.14  
The Withdrawal Agreement secures the position of EU nationals in the UK, with only some 
individuals who are currently protected by EU law not protected in the Withdrawal 
Agreement.15 The existing provisions for mutual recognition of professional qualifications and 
the related alert mechanisms, which provide for exchange of information on health 
professionals who have been subject to disciplinary proceedings, as well as employment 
rights, will continue until the end of December 2020. There will be a greater administrative 
burden for EU/EEA nationals to reside in the UK, and related uncertainty for individuals 
awaiting administrative decisions. The Withdrawal Agreement does not specify the process 
of securing rights in detail, but it does provide a minimum core of enforceable rights. 
The Backstop does not include protections for residency of EU/EEA nationals, or mutual 
UHFRJQLWLRQRITXDOLILFDWLRQV,WGRHVKRZHYHULQFOXGHVRPHµOHYHOSOD\LQJILHOG¶UXOHVLQ
employment law, particularly equality rights under the Good Friday Agreement. These 
include equal treatment in employment on the basis of sex, race, religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation, and on the basis of sex for social security, but, importantly, 
nationality is not a forbidden ground for discrimination under these laws. While Irish citizens 
will continue to be able to rely on the provisions of the Common Travel Area between the UK 
and Ireland,16 other EU/EEA residents in the UK will no longer have their residency in the UK 
protected (other than any protections that the UK may choose to provide unilaterally). It is 
unclear how mutual recognition of qualifications between the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland would operate.17 Free movement of persons would end, with recruitment 
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and retention of EU nationals into the NHS after December 2020 under UK immigration law 
only.  
Under a No Deal Brexit, entitlements of EU nationals in the UK would be based on UK 
domestic law only from 29 March 2019. Employment rights from EU law will initially be rolled 
over into UK law, but can be amended by executive action under EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. 
Mutual recognition of qualifications and the protections it gives stops immediately, which 
may affect recruitment of health workers from the EU/EEA and will limit information 
exchange about health professionals moving across Europe. The Immigration and Social 
Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill 2019 removes the special status of EU/EEA 
nationals (except Irish nationals) in UK immigration law. How that general immigration law 
will develop in the future is uncertain, but the Immigration White Paper indicates that it will be 
skills-based. There are no proposed provisions facilitating recruitment and retention of NHS 
workers. The proposed minimum salary threshold of £30,000 per annum could seriously limit 
immigration of many health workers. 
This is also the case for the Political Declaration on the Future Relationship. The Declaration 
envisages an end to free movement, and does not envisage any specific conditions for entry 
and stay related to health in particular or public service in general (though it does for 
research, study, training and youth exchanges). If the NHS is to employ staff from EU/EEA 
countries under the future relationship, this will be on the basis of UK immigration law only. 
Typically, FTAs such as the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) do not involve enforceable employment rights provisions, although this depends on 
WKHGHJUHHRILQWHJUDWLRQDQGµOHYHOSOD\LQJILHOG¶UHTXLUHPHQWVZKLFKZRXOGEHGHHSHUXQGHU
µ1RUZD\¶$FFHVVWRWKH(8PDUNHWZLOOEHFRQWLQJHQWRQDOLJQPHQW in a range of areas of 
which employment rights is one, as well as agreement on dispute settlement.  
Under a No-Deal Brexit, or with the envisaged future relationship, in theory the UK will enjoy 
increased autonomy and hence flexibility to set and assess requirements for health 
professions (eg: shorter training, different professional skill mix), as well as general 
employment law standards. But in practice, if standards make it more difficult to recruit staff, 
it will be even harder to recruit from outside the UK. If standards are lower, there is a 
consequent trade-off for patient confidence/safety. Furthermore, if the UK chooses to remain 
aligned with the EU, it will lose the ability to inform regulatory standards as it has as an EU 
member. The Political Declaration indicates a weak ambition for arrangements on mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications; but this is already less ambitious than the Canada-
EU Free Trade Agreement, which has not yet led to any substantive cooperation. 
2. Financing 
NHS financing post-Brexit includes the direct effects of financing patient care under 
reciprocal healthcare arrangements; access to capital financing for NHS infrastructure; and 
the broader effects of the post-Brexit economy on NHS financing generally. 
The only aspect of NHS financing post-Brexit where we can expect no change is for 
reciprocal health care under the Withdrawal Agreement. Existing mechanisms for 
coordination of social security would continue. These include the European Health Insurance 
Card (EHIC), referral for planned cross-border care and healthcare for EU nationals resident 
in another EU country (e.g. UK retirees in Spain). H
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being correctly registered; and given discrepancies between the number of British people 
resident in Spain and those formally registered, this may cause problems in practice. 
All other aspects of NHS financing are negatively affected. The Withdrawal Agreement will 
secure continuity for current European Investment Bank-funded projects, but no new 
projects after March 2019, as these are reserved for Member States. The certainty and 
continuity secured under the Withdrawal Agreement and the Backstop mean less of a 
negative effect on the economy as a whole than a No Deal Brexit, with the corresponding 
likely effect on NHS funding. 
No Deal Brexit means an immediate end to reciprocal healthcare arrangements in March 
2019. The Backstop makes no provision for continued reciprocal healthcare arrangements, 
so under the Withdrawal Agreement, these would cease at the end of December 2020. In 
the case of No Deal, and, logically, in the absence of any future agreement, the UK 
government has advised that visitors to EU/EEA countries need medical insurance as the 
(+,&µPD\QRWEHYDOLG¶.18 IWZRXOGEHPRUHDFFXUDWHWRVD\WKDWWKH(+,&V\VWHPµZLOO
FHDVH¶DORQJZLWKWKHIUDPHZRUNIRUDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIIVHWEHWZHHQ8.DQG(8FRXQWULHV
This will have major consequences for older UK residents, especially if they have pre-
existing conditions, as insurance cover, which may not be available for those with the most 
severe conditions, could be extremely expensive.19 Some other groups will be particularly 
affected, such as patients on dialysis who benefit from provisions that allow them to receive 
it in centres in other Member States.20 It is also unclear what will happen to UK pensioners 
living in the EU27 who are in the middle of a course of treatment there and are no longer 
entitled to cover, who would be protected under the Withdrawal Agreement.  
The Common Travel Area protects reciprocal rights for Irish nationals in UK and UK 
nationals in the Republic of Ireland, but other EEA nationals who arrive after March 2019 (if 
No Deal) or 2020 (if Backstop) have access to healthcare under UK domestic law only.16 The 
Immigration White Paper16  proposes an extension of the Immigration Health Surcharge, 
typically £400 per year, to EEA nationals. The UK government has recently confirmed that in 
a no-deal scenario, UK nationals resident in EU-27 countries who return permanently to UK 
will have full access to NHS on same basis as those resident in the UK now.21 
For the longer term, the Political Declaration is likely to mean a moderately negative impact. 
It envisages the possibility of some weaker form of reciprocal healthcare coordination for 
visitors in the future than currently, but as this is linked to future free movement provisions 
between the UK and the EU, taken together with wider plans on immigration it seems 
unlikely to be realised in practice. Some individual EU MS (e.g. Spain) have indicated 
willingness to enter into bilateral reciprocal arrangements, and the UK Secretary of State will 
be given power to enter into such agreements.22 These arrangements would sit outside the 
(8¶VLQIUDVWUXFWXUHZKLFKPLJKWFUHDWHVRPHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHand legal difficulties. 
In our previous paper we noted that the consensus of economic forecasts was that Brexit 
would have a negative impact on the UK economy. This has been borne out; the latest 
report on Brexit from the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) concludes that 
cumulative economic growth has been between 2 and 2.5 percentage points less than it 
would otherwise have been since the referendum. Looking ahead, while all forecasting is 
GLIILFXOWWKHVLWXDWLRQZLWK%UH[LWLVHVSHFLDOO\VR7KH2%5¶VPRVWUHFHQWDQDO\VLVZDV
unusually critical of the governmHQW¶VIDLOXUHWRSURYLGHDQ\³PHDQLQJIXOEDVLVIRUSUHGLFWLQJ
the post-%UH[LWUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH8.DQG(8´RQZKLFKWREDVHLWVHVWLPDWHV23 
However, all serious analyses predict a much slower rate of growth compared to remaining, 
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with the impact increasing as the UK-EU relationship becomes more disconnected.24 
,PSRUWDQWO\WKHFODLPE\WKH&KDQFHOORURIWKH([FKHTXHU¶VWKDWWKHDJreement reached with 
the EU in December ZRXOG\LHOGD³GHDOGLYLGHQG´KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDV³QRWFUHGLEOH´
by the parliamentary Treasury Committee.25  
As one of the largest areas of public expenditure, any negative impact on the UK economy 
will put additional pressure on NHS financing, even though the exact impact will depend on 
the form of Brexit and on policy responses, including the extent to which the government is 
willing to raise taxes, increase borrowing and prioritise different sectors. Given looming 
crises in several other sectors, including welfare and the criminal justice system, there must 
be concerns about whether the government can maintain its funding commitments for the 
NHS. 
Indirect effects of Brexit in other areas that may impact health, such as food supply, are also 
important.26 The UK is especially dependent on imports of fresh fruit and vegetables and a 
recent modelling study estimated that a No Deal Brexit could lead to between 6,000 and 
23,000 excess deaths from cardiovascular disease between 2021 and 2030.27  
Further, many elements of UK laws on public health derive from EU legislation, for example 
on air pollution, health and safety, and trade within the single market in substances posing a 
risk to health, such as tobacco. There are concerns that the UK may use Brexit to roll back 
some of these measures, especially as it has failed to meet some of the existing EU 
standards, for example on air quality. Changes to these broader determinants of health 
would have indirect implications for the NHS and its resourcing, if population health 
worsened, particularly in geographic areas or socio-economic groups where health is 
already worse. Following a sustained campaign by the Faculty of Public Health to translate 
the obligation on the EU in the Treaties to ensure a high level of human health in its policies, 
Ministers gave a verbal assurance that tKH\ZRXOGPDLQWDLQVWDQGDUGVVRDVWR³GRQR
KDUP´28 although they rejected enshrining it in legislation, thereby weakening the existing 
legal protections.  
3. Medical products, vaccines and technology 
The Withdrawal Agreement would mean continued application of EU law to products 
circulating between the UK and the EU. Products manufactured in either the UK or the EU 
will continue to be able to be marketed in either territory without unjustified restrictions. This 
continuity of legal relations will secure supply chains for medicines, vaccines, medical 
devices and equipment and other health consumables, on which the NHS relies, after 29 
March 2019, until the end of December 2020, and longer if the Backstop comes into effect. 
Information sharing through EU databases continues. After March 2019, the UK becomes a 
rule-taker in terms of licensing of medicines through the centralised procedure (which 
applies to all biotechnology and similar innovative medicines), as it must accept the 
(XURSHDQ0HGLFLQHV$JHQF\¶VDXWKRULVDWLRQVEXWFDQQRWOHDGRQVXFKOLFHQVLQJLWVHOI. Under 
any form of Brexit, the UK will no longer be part of the European Medicines Agency, entailing 
loss of global influence unless the UK can gain a status in the International Council on 
Harmonisation.29 The MHRA will, however, be able to continue to licence medicines subject 
to the decentralised procedure, and the EU will recognise that licensing, and vice versa. UK-
EDVHGµQRWLILHGERGLHV¶WKDWFHUWLI\VDIHW\UHTXLUHPHQWVDUe met for medical devices will 
continue to be recognised in the EU, and vice versa. By December 2020, such notified 
bodies are required to have shared their information so that medical device manufacturers 
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can transfer to an EU-based notified body if they wish to continue to sell in the EU after that 
date.  
If the Backstop comes into effect, medicines for the EU market may be manufactured in 
Northern Ireland, but medicines manufactured in the rest of the UK will be treated by the EU 
DVFRPLQJIURPDµWKLUGFRXQWU\¶It is unclear what will happen to information sharing, but the 
Protocol makes provision for administrative structures within which such questions could be 
resolved. UK medicines licenses would no longer be recognised by the EU.   
The Political Declaration on the Future Relationship indicates potential for weaker 
cooperation with the EU on licensing and regulation of medicines than is currently in place. 
Radioisotope cooperation is also envisaged, although the practical arrangements remain 
uncertain and the UK is likely to have low priority should shortages arise.30 In the medium 
term, without laws in place to secure regulatory alignment, the UK would become less 
attractive for launch of new medicines by global pharma31 with launch dates of up to 24 
months later. 32 
Under a No Deal Brexit, the absence of a legal framework for imports and exports is 
expected to have an immediate and drastic effect on supply chains.  The UK government 
has sought to reassure patients that its contingency plans with the pharmaceutical industry 
are robust, but shortages are likely as stockpiling arrangements cannot cope for more than a 
IHZZHHNV7KHJRYHUQPHQWLVSURSRVLQJWKDW*3VSUHVFULEHµEHVWDOWHUQDWLYHPHGLFDWLRQ¶33 
which can be distressing and confusing for some patients.  Some products, such as 
UDGLRLVRWRSHVFDQQRWEHVWRFNSLOHG7KH8.ZRXOGLPPHGLDWHO\EHWUHDWHGDVµWKLUGFRXQWU\¶
for licensing and manufacture purposes. Some firms may not have transferred licences to 
EEA-based entities in time.344. Information 
A No Deal Brexit would involve an abrupt end to information sharing and collaboration based 
on EU law. This would immediately affect cooperation in areas such as cross border 
movements of patients, disease surveillance, cross-border clinical trials and other health 
research, registries, monitoring of the safety of pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and of 
the fitness to practise of health professionals. The Withdrawal Agreement would secure 
continued access to information and cooperation until the end of December 2020; and the 
Backstop would secure information sharing on products and substances of human origin 
thereafter. There is no specific cooperation on health information envisaged under the 
Political Declaration on the Future Relationship, although other cooperation structures (in 
particular through the World Health Organization) could provide an alternative for some 
forms of information sharing, though not based on EU law. 
5. Service delivery 
Although in theory under a No Deal Brexit and the future relationship as indicated in the 
Political Declaration, there is scope for the UK to change aspects of NHS service delivery 
related to terms of employment, such as working time legislation, in practice the scope for 
change is limited, as key provisions of existing European law are written into existing 
contracts, in particular those of junior doctors. Under the Withdrawal Agreement and the 
BacNVWRSPXFKRIWKH(8¶VOHJDOIUDPHZRUNIRUHPSOR\PHQWODZFRQWLQXHVWRDSSO\LQWKH
UK. 
Provisions of EU law (particularly the Patients¶ Rights Directive) are currently being relied on 
by health trusts in some areas of the UK in order to respond to long waiting times, for 
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instance for knee operations. Patients are invited to pay upfront, but then are reimbursed.14 
These arrangements would continue under the Withdrawal Agreement. The Northern Ireland 
Protocol does not explicitly cover service provision, but it seeks to continue all-Ireland 
activities and structures, such as Cooperation and Working Together (CAWT), established 
DVSDUWRIWKH(8¶VSURJUDPPHWRSURPRWHSHDFHDQGUHFRQFLOLDWLRQunder which much 
shared healthcare infrastructure falls. Under a No Deal Brexit, all of these arrangements and 
possibilities would cease with immediate effect.  
Brexit will have especially important consequences for health services in Ireland (Panel). 
6. Leadership and governance 
Some effects of Brexit for leadership and governance in health will have indirect effects on 
WKH1+6LQWKDWWKH8.¶VEuropean and global health leadership position will be diminished. 
Under the Withdrawal Agreement, from 29 March 2019, the UK is in principle excluded from 
EU institutions and agencies. It may not: nominate, appoint or elect members; participate in 
decision-making; attend meetings, including of expert groups, except where the Withdrawal 
Agreement explicitly provides otherwise.  This includes the European Centre for Disease 
Control (ECDC), which is not specifically mentioned in the Withdrawal Agreement. As of 29 
March 2019 the UK will be excluded from its decision making, though it will participate in 
information exchange until the end of the transition. The ECDC, like the network that 
coordinates health technology assessment, has been strongly influenced by the UK and the 
end of SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHVHQHWZRUNVZLOOGLPLQLVKWKH8.¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQIOXHQFHRQ
standard setting in health.  
Under the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK may observe and send an advisory representative 
to the Administrative Commission for coordination of social security, which oversees 
reciprocal healthcare arrangements. The Withdrawal Agreement also covers meetings of EU 
agencies involving experts, which includes the decision-making procedures of the European 
Medicines Agency.  UK experts may be invited to attend, but may not vote in, meetings or 
SDUWVRIPHHWLQJVZKHUHHLWKHUWKHGHFLVLRQVDSSO\WRWKH8.RUHQWLWLHVLQWKH8.RUµWKH
SUHVHQFHRIWKH8.LVQHFHVVDU\DQGLQWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKH8QLRQ¶However, after 29 March 
2019, the UK is excluded from DFWLQJDVOHDGDXWKRULW\LQµULVNDVVHVVPHQWVH[DPLQDWLRQV
DSSURYDOVRUDXWKRULVDWLRQV¶   
The Withdrawal Agreement does not explicitly mention public health collaborations between 
the UK and EU, but this is likely to continue at global level, for instance, through the G7 and 
on health security through the WHO. One of the few places where health-related matters are 
covered in the Political Declaration concerns security. Obviously, exclusion from EU 
cooperation will result in a weakening of UK influence both in matters where the EU is 
concerned with health, and also where the EU interacts through global health entities such 
as the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use or WHO. The UK may be able to exert some 
influence through these global entitles, but doing so as a smaller economic entity than as 
part of the larger EU is likely to have the obvious implications.  
It has been suggested that leaving the EU might free the NHS from some of the obligations 
of EU competition and public procurement law, thereby making it possible to roll back recent 
market-oriented reforms to the English NHS, such as those in the 2012 Health and Social 
Care Act. EU law has often been seen as promoting marketization and competition in health 
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services. However, the magnitude of concerns is not matched by the reality of EU law in this 
area.  EU law provides many exemptions for public services, in particular under the 
description of µservices of general interest¶, and in most cases it is a matter for national 
governments as to whether they do open their health systems to competition, although if 
they do they must then abide by relevant EU law. It was the decision of the UK government 
in the 2012 Act, not the EU, to impose EU competition law on health care in England.35 
Importantly, the Treaties and a succession of rulings RIWKH(8¶V&RXUWRI-XVWLFH have 
served to protect health services in several Member States from potential consequences of 
internal market provision. It is very unlikely that these protections would be replicated in any 
future trade deals with, in particular, the USA.36 It may be, though, that being formally 
removed from the application of EU competition and procurement law might reassure 
perceived concerns in a way that would create scope for more efficient organisation of the 
NHS. 
7KH8.KDVSOD\HGDNH\UROHLQWKH(8¶VUHJXODWLRQRIELRPHGLFDOUHVHDUFKand has 
benefited significantly from collaborative EU research funding in biomedical fields.  For 
instance, many EU-funded rare diseases networks are led by UK-based clinicians. EU law 
underpins information exchange in cross-border clinical trials, as well as setting regulatory 
standards and broad requirements for ethical oversight, although significant discretion 
remains at national levels.  The new Clinical Trials Regulation will provide centralised 
infrastructure in a single EU portal, facilitating access to the EU market for new drugs. All of 
these arrangements continue under the Withdrawal Agreement. 
Under the Backstop, it will remain possible for products in EU-based clinical trials to be 
sourced from Northern Ireland, but the service of carrying out a clinical trial is not covered by 
the Protocol, and so access by UK entities to cross-border clinical trials within the EU would 
end.  
The Political Declaration envisages a relationship centred around a free trade agreement; 
KRZIDUWKH(8¶VUXOHVRQWUDGH and competition would continue to apply to the UK would 
thus depend on the depth of that agreement. Continued participation in EU programmes 
such research and technological development is envisaged, but on worse terms for the UK, 
with negative consequences for the UK¶V global leadership and influence across range of 
research areas.32 Ironically, collaboration on public health is specifically envisaged at a 
global level, though not at a European one.  
Under a No Deal Brexit, all collaborations would immediately lose the legal basis on which 
they are carried out, making data sharing across borders impossible unless the EU formally 
recognises the UK¶VGDWDSURWHFWLRQODZVDVFRPSOLDQWZLWK(8ODZZKLFKthey would be as 
µUROOHGRYHU¶LQWRUHWDLQHG(8ODZXQGHUWKH(8:LWKGUDZDO$FWXQOHVVDPHQGHG 
and access to funding would end, presumably with immediate effect. Regulatory uncertainty 
under No Deal has already halted one clinical trial in Scotland in December 2018.37 
So far, we have focused on the specific consequences of withdrawal for the healthcare 
system. However, it is important to reflect on the wider implications for the machinery of 
government. Planning for Brexit has involved moving hundreds of civil servants to other 
government departments, while many remaining in their departments have been moved to 
Brexit-related work. Even so, there is very little evidence that the UK is prepared for any of 
the eventualities set out above. This applies both to the machinery of government and to 
Parliament, which faces the virtually impossible task of scrutinising and passing several 
major pieces of legislation and up to 600 Statutory Instruments, some of great complexity, all 
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by the end of March 2019.38 Much has been undertaken in great secrecy, limiting scope for 
either Parliament or other stakeholders to assess what is being done. Thus, the Secretary of 
State for Health has reported the scale of the additional capacity obtained for storing 
medicines but there is no information on the planning assumptions underlying the decision, 
or its costs and where they will fall. Where information has become available, as with the 
(now rescinded) contract for additional ferry capacity awarded to a company with no 
ferries,39 it has raised many unanswered questions. Meanwhile, other important legislation, 
such as that concerning social care, has suffered prolonged delays. Jonathan Powell, a 
IRUPHU'RZQLQJ6WUHHW&KLHIRI6WDIIKDVVWDWHGWKDW³When the inquiry is eventually held 
into Brexit it will « focus not just on individual failings but the whole system ± the 
government, the opposition and even the civil service´.40  
Conclusion 
In summary, our analysis suggests that leaving the EU under any of the four scenarios 
would be worse for the NHS than staying. However, by far the worst option would be a No 
Deal Brexit. The Withdrawal Agreement is likely to have many adverse consequences, but 
will also allow much to remain as it is until December 2020. The impact of the Backstop is 
likely to be uneven, effectively continuing the current position in some areas (in particular for 
medical products, vaccines and technology), but with a negative impact in most other areas. 
The Political Declaration on the Future Relationship envisages a free trade agreement 
similar to that between the EU and Canada; although it proposes going beyond that 
agreement some areas, these are areas such as transport and energy that do not directly 
address health-related issues.  
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Panel:  The Irish border 
Following Brexit, the EU will have three land borders with the UK: in Cyprus, where the UK 
has two Sovereign Base Areas; between Gibraltar and Spain; and on the island of Ireland. A 
No Deal situation would create major problems for all three. For example, it would remove 
the legal basis for free movement of the 11,000 Cypriot nationals living in the base areas41 
and the Gibraltar economy is threatened by the loss of access to EU markets by financial 
services.42 But it is the Irish border that has proven most challenging. Created in 1922, that 
border is 499 km long and is crossed by 270 public roads. Its creation severely disrupted 
historic trading arrangements as many of the roads were closed or designated as 
³XQDSSURYHGFURVVLQJV´DQGFXVWRPVSRVWVZHUHHUHFWHGWRFRQGXFWFKHFNVRQDOOJRRGVLQ
transit and to collect duties. These checks became especially important during the Anglo-
Irish Trade War (1932-ZKHQERWKFRXQWULHVLPSRVHGKLJKWDULIIVRQHDFKRWKHU¶V
exports. However, except briefly in World War 2, free movement of people continued without 
the need to show a passport. The customs posts were removed when both countries joined 
the EU in 1973 but by then their locations had been replaced by military checkpoints in 
response to the growing violence in Northern Ireland. At that time many of the minor roads 
were blocked with concrete barriers or cratered by explosives. The Good Friday/1998 
Agreement, endorsed overwhelmingly by referendums in both jurisdictions, paved the way 
for extensive cross border collaboration, based on shared institutions. Since then, the 
economies on either side of the border have become integrated. Health has been an 
important element of these developments, including the Co-operation and Working Together 
(CAWT) programme, which facilitates cross border collaboration and sharing of health 
infrastructure, especially in the geographical north, taking advantage of economies of scale. 
Thus, patients in border areas will often be referred for specialist care in a facility in the other 
jurisdiction if it is more convenient.43 Large numbers of health workers cross the border 
every day, with some working part time on both sides of it.  
 
As an international treaty, the Good Friday/1998 Agreement requires the UK government to 
keep the border open. However, this is obviously incompatible with Northern Ireland leaving 
WKH(8¶VFXVWRPVXQLRQDQGVLQJOHPDUNHWDVWKDWZRXOGOHDYHDODUJHJDSLQWKH(8¶V
exteUQDOERUGHU7KH:LWKGUDZDO$JUHHPHQW¶VµBackstop¶LQLWV1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG3URWRFRO
comes into effect if the UK fails to agree a future trade agreement resolving this problem. 
7KH3URWRFRO¶VRbjectives include avoiding a hard border, protecting the Good Friday/1998 
Agreement and maintaining the necessary conditions for continued North-South cooperation, 
implicitly including CAWT. 
 
7KHµBackstop¶HVWDEOLVKHVDVLQJOHFXVWRPVWHUULWRU\EHWZHHQWKH(8DQGWKH8.7KLV
means that no tariffs or taxes could be imposed on products moving between the UK and the 
EU, and the same external tariffs would apply to products from other countries coming into 
the UK and EU. In this way, the UK government meets the obligation in the Taxation (Cross-
%RUGHU7UDGH$FWQRWWRµHQWHULQWRDUUDQJHPHQWVXQGHUZKLFK1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGIRUPV
SDUWRIDVHSDUDWHFXVWRPVWHUULWRU\WR*UHDW%ULWDLQ¶)RUWKHUHJXODWLRQRISURGXFWVQRQ-tariff 
barriers), the Protocol extends the application of all relevant EU law (product standards, 
marketing and product safety, listed at length in Annex 5 of the Protocol) to Northern Ireland. 
The Protocol itself does not directly or formally require the same standards for products 
being produced or marketed in Great Britain, but if the UK wants to keep a single regulatory 
market including Northern Ireland, and avoid an internal border for products in the Irish sea, 
then in practice the UK will have to align with EU standards.7 
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It is far from clear what would happen in a No Deal Brexit, although a leading Northern 
,UHODQGJHQHUDOSUDFWLWLRQHUKDVGHVFULEHGLWDVD³SRWHQWLDOGLVDVWHU´44 Maintaining the 
Common Travel Area is a priority for the UK government.2 The Common Travel Area is not 
an international agreement, but a relatively complex series of national laws in the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland, which have the effect of treating UK and Irish nationals almost identically 
in both states.45 The UK has confirmed that its recognition of the rights of Irish nationals will 
continue even in the event of a No Deal Brexit, and that Irish nationals will not be required to 
DFTXLUHWKHQHZµVHWWOHGVWDWXV¶46 EU law permits Ireland to continue to apply the Common 
Travel Area provisions to UK citizens,47 and Ireland has committed to so doing.48, 49  Thus, 
while the provisions for (most) people would continue under No Deal, arrangements for 
products and services pose a major challenge.  The Irish government would be required to 
impose some sort of frontier for products and services, with an inevitable risk of attacks on 
border infrastructure. While some Brexit supporters have advocated technological solutions, 
in reality none are currently sufficiently developed. The consequences for cross border 
collaboration in health services would be profound, because the legal basis for much of what 
now happens would be removed.  These include rules on recognition of qualifications of 
cross-border health workers, their rights (for example a Polish doctor living on one side of 
the border and working on the other), the movement of blood products and morphine across 
borders in ambulances, and service contracts to maintain equipment.   
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Table 1 Impact of four different Brexit scenarios 
  
  
No Deal Brexit Transition (the WA) Backstop (NI Protocol) Future relationship 
Workforce 
  
  
Recruitment 
and retention 
of EU 
nationals in 
the NHS 
No provisions facilitating 
recruitment and retention of 
NHS workers. 
Legal framework 
continues with some 
changes, retention and 
recruitment continues. 
Uncertainty over 
administrative 
arrangements. 
The Backstop does not 
include protections for 
residency of EU/EEA 
nationals.  Irish nationals in 
UK do not need new status; 
all other EEA nationals do. 
No provisions facilitating 
recruitment and retention 
of NHS workers. 
Mutual 
recognition of 
professional 
qualifications 
Theoretical potential to improve 
standards likely to be hampered 
in practice by recruitment 
needs. 
The existing provisions 
for mutual recognition 
of professional 
qualifications and the 
related alert 
mechanisms will 
continue. 
Theoretical potential to 
improve standards likely to 
be hampered in practice by 
recruitment needs. 
Declaration indicates weak 
ambition for arrangements 
on mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications; 
but this is already less 
ambitious than the Canada-
EU Free Trade Agreement, 
which has not yet led to any 
substantive cooperation. 
Mutual recognition and 
protections it gives stops 
immediately, and will limit 
information exchange about 
health professionals moving 
across Europe. 
No provisions for mutual 
recognition beyond end of 
transitional period. 
Employment 
rights for 
health 
workers 
No protection other than in 
domestic law of existing rights. 
Legal framework 
continues. 
Legal framework continues 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐŽŵĞ ‘ůĞǀĞůƉůĂǇŝŶŐ
ĨŝĞůĚ ?ƌƵůĞƐŝŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ
law. Nationality is not a 
forbidden ground of 
discrimination under these 
laws.  
Typically FTAs like CETA do 
not involve enforceable 
employment rights 
provisions. 
2 
 
Financing 
  
  
Reciprocal 
healthcare 
arrangements 
No rights in place as legal 
framework ceases immediately.  
 
Existing mechanism 
for coordination of 
social security 
continues. May be 
practical registration 
issues. 
No provision for continued 
reciprocal arrangements for 
social security under the 
Northern Ireland Protocol. 
Potential for some weaker 
form of reciprocal 
healthcare coordination 
than currently, but linked to 
future free movement 
between the UK and the EU.  
Capital 
financing for 
the NHS 
Access to EIB stopped and 
capital financing generally 
undermined.  
Legal framework 
continues for existing 
EIB financed projects 
but no new financing 
from the EIB.  
Access to EIB stopped and 
capital financing generally 
undermined. 
Potential to participate in 
and receive funding from 
the EIB; likely lower level of 
capital financing than 
currently. 
Indirect impact 
on NHS 
financing 
Severe effect on wider economy 
and thus NHS financing. 
Some effect on wider 
economy and thus 
NHS financing. 
Some effect on wider 
economy and thus NHS 
financing. 
Some effect on wider 
economy and thus NHS 
financing.  
Medical 
products, 
vaccines, 
and 
technology 
  
Pharmaceutica
ls 
Absence of legal framework for 
imports/exports drastically 
affects supply chains.  Major 
disruption expected. 
Continued application 
of EU law to 
circulation of 
medicinal products. 
For regulation and 
licensing, the UK 
becomes a rule-taker. 
Loss of global 
influence through role 
in European Medicines 
Agency 
Continued application of EU 
law to circulation of 
medicinal products. Special 
arrangements for medicines 
manufactured in Northern 
Ireland. For regulation and 
licensing, the UK would not 
be able to license products 
for the EU.  
Potential for some weaker 
cooperation with EU on 
licensing and regulation of 
medicines than currently. 
Other medical 
products 
Major concerns about timely 
access to radioisotopes 
Continuity of supply 
secured 
 As for pharmaceuticals. 
 
As for pharmaceuticals. 
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Information   Absence of legal framework 
means end of information 
collaboration based on EU law.  
Current legal 
framework continues, 
current information 
exchange activities 
continue.  
Access only to information 
systems related to 
circulation of goods (ie: 
pharmaceuticals, medical 
devices) and substances of 
human origin (eg: blood).   
Access to other health-
related information systems 
ends. 
No specific cooperation on 
health information 
envisaged. 
Service 
delivery 
  
Working 
Time 
legislation 
Regulation of working time and 
other conditions of work 
formally returns to the UK.  But 
scope to change in practice is 
limited 
Legal framework 
continues. 
Legal framework continues 
under level playing field rules 
in NI Protocol. 
Regulation of working time 
and other conditions of 
work formally returns to 
the UK.  But scope to 
change in practice is 
limited.  
Cross-border 
care 
No framework for cross-border 
care to cope with long waiting 
times and administration/offset 
between UK and EU countries 
Legal framework 
continues. 
Not covered, except for 
island of Ireland implicitly 
and as part of the Co-
operation and Working 
Together (CAWT) to promote 
peace and reconciliation. 
Cross-border health 
services not envisaged as 
part of the future 
relationship. 
Leadership 
and 
governance 
  
  
  
Public 
health 
The government has offered 
reassurances to maintain EU 
standards but refused to 
enshrine them in legislation. 
Absence of EU law means that 
upholding public health 
standards in future depends on 
Legal framework 
continues but UK is 
outside EU 
institutional 
structures so loss of 
role in e.g. ECDC 
Government reassurances to 
maintain EU standards, but 
scope to improve public 
health standards is 
contingent on political will. 
Limited or no participation 
in decisions by e.g. ECDC. 
Impact of EU rules 
dependent on depth of 
partnership. Limited or no 
participation in decisions 
by e.g. ECDC. 
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on political will of government 
of the day 
Existing protections can be 
removed by executive action 
No mention in WA Existing protections can be 
removed by executive action 
Continued collaboration on 
public health at global 
level  
Trade and 
competition 
NHS (England) no longer 
operates in perceived shadow 
of EU competition & public 
procurement law provisions 
which are felt to drive 
inefficient behaviours in 
context of NHS 
Legal framework 
continues but UK is 
outside EU 
institutional 
structures so loss of 
role 
Legal framework continues 
under NIP level playing field 
rules 
Impact of EU rules 
dependent on depth of 
partnership 
Outside EU trade structures, 
h< ?ƐŐůŽďĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽǀĞƌ
health in trade deals reduced 
(further). Some existing 
protections could be removed 
by executive action 
Research Collaborations and funding 
from EU ended. No access to 
ůŝŶŝĐĂůdƌŝĂůƐZĞŐ ?ƐƉŽƌƚĂů ?>ŽƐƐ
of global influence.  
Collaborations and 
funding, plus legal 
framework, continue 
until end 2020 
Product access, but 
otherwise collaborations 
and funding from EU ended. 
Loss of global influence 
Continued participation in 
research envisaged, but on 
worse terms for the UK. 
Loss of global leadership & 
influence  
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Scrutiny and 
stakeholder 
engagement 
Volume of new legislation 
already limiting scrutiny and 
engagement, will continue 
Volume of new 
legislation and 
executive powers 
under EU (W) Act 
limits scrutiny and 
engagement 
Volume of new legislation 
and executive powers under 
EU (W) Act, plus new trade 
agreements, limits scrutiny 
and engagement 
Volume of new legislation 
and executive powers 
under EU (W) Act, plus 
new trade agreements, 
limits scrutiny and 
engagement 
Grey = broadly unchanged; Green = positive; pale red = moderate negative; red = major negative 
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